Why Harim’s The Miso Premium Strategy Struggled

An ambitious launch meets a practical wall

Harim Group chairman Kim Hong-kook launched The Miso in 2021 with an ambition to build a comprehensive food company and reach KRW 1.5 trillion in annual sales. The brand was run in a top-down manner, with the chairman personally conducting the final taste test for new products. Five years later, the outcome is far from that ambition: cumulative losses reached KRW 412.3 billion.

This is not simply a story about one expensive ramen. It is about what happens when a “premium” proposition is not clear enough for people to pay for repeatedly.

Premium price, insufficient value

The Miso’s prices put it well above familiar Korean staples:

• The Miso Artisan Ramen: KRW 2,200, more than twice Shin Ramyun
• The Miso instant rice: KRW 2,300, KRW 450 more than Hetbahn
• meat dumplings: KRW 11,000 for 700 g, markedly more expensive per unit than Bibigo King Dumplings at KRW 11,530 for 1.05 kg

Higher price can work when the benefit is concrete. Here, customers struggled to see why the improvement justified the gap. The problem was made sharper by the allocation of effort: R&D investment was KRW 1.1 billion in 2024, while advertising and promotion spending was KRW 26.2 billion in 2023. Core products were also sourced externally through OEM and ODM arrangements.

The imbalance matters. A premium brand needs product evidence before it needs a larger campaign.

A strategy moving against its time

Korean consumers have become more selective about the premium they pay. They will spend more for clear quality, a distinctive experience, convenience, health, or social meaning. A broad “better ingredients” signal is less persuasive when supermarket shelves already offer low-cost imports, established domestic brands, and many convenience options.

The Miso tried to extend across ramen, rice, dumplings, soups, and meal kits. But breadth did not create depth. In ramen, products such as artisan ramen, bibim noodles, and squid ramen read as “me-too” variants. Its more than 20 soup products—including Korean-beef brisket soup and yukgaejang—did not establish a sharp difference. Dumplings resembled Bibigo’s lineup, and five meal kits entered a crowded market late.

The contrast with products that succeeded

Samyang’s Buldak ramen shows what clear differentiation can do. The company analyzed peppers from around the world and spent more than a year developing a distinctive “sweet and spicy” taste. Consumers, not paid campaigns, drove the Fire Noodle Challenge into global viral culture. Buldak reached 97 countries, with 77% of revenue from overseas markets; cumulative sales reached KRW 4 trillion and 7 billion units.

Other Korean examples are more specific than The Miso’s broad premium claim:

• Nongshim Shin Ramyun Black differentiated itself with beef-bone broth and abundant ingredients; it was named the top instant ramen in a New York Times selection.
• Ottogi Jin Jjambbong benchmarked 88 jjamppong restaurants nationwide and recreated wok-fired flavor, selling 100 million units within 173 days.

The lesson is not that every product needs virality. It is that customers need an explainable reason to choose it.

The shadow of organizational culture

A chairman-led final tasting process can speed decisions, but it can also narrow the route by which outside evidence reaches the product. When a portfolio expands quickly, the organization can confuse the founder’s conviction, attractive packaging, and broad assortment with a product-market fit that consumers will actually repeat.

The Miso’s catalogue shows the risk. The company kept adding categories without establishing a single product that consumers could describe as uniquely theirs. The result was a premium-looking portfolio without a sufficiently deep reason to buy.

The missing reason to purchase

The essential question is simple: why should someone choose this product today, at this price, over the familiar alternatives?

The Miso’s package design often succeeded at communicating refinement. Consumer reactions could acknowledge that it looked premium while still saying that the design did not create an immediate desire to buy. In food and beverage, design is an option, not the reason itself. Taste, value, occasion, and habit must carry the brand.

Premium needs to be redefined

Premium food works when the increase in price is tied to a concrete improvement:

• Starbucks VIA added microground coffee to pursue a cup closer to store coffee.
• Nespresso used a capsule system to provide consistent quality, expert advice, and pickup service.
• CJ Bibigo built a global brand through higher-quality ingredients and more developed recipes.

For The Miso, a reset would require fewer vague signals and more proof. It would need a focused audience, a distinctive product experience, and a reason to return that remains clear after the package is gone. A premium strategy cannot be sustained by price, advertising, or design alone; it has to be earned at the moment of eating.